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EMILY SHERWIN*
Recent debate about theory in legal scholarship' has raised more
questions about theory and law than it has answered. For example, just
what is meant by "theory" in the context of law? Is there a form of
theory that is uniquely "legal" theory, or is legal theory merely moral
theory applied to law? If there is such a thing as legal theory, does the
body of positive law, and particularly the decisions of judges, inform
legal theory, or does theory inform law? What, if any, are the
justifications for constructing theories of law?
In a chapter of his recent book Placing Blame, entitled "A Theory of
Criminal Law Theories," 2 Michael Moore addresses some of these
questions from the point of view of a theorist and moral realist. The
following collection of short papers includes a reprise and defense of
Moore's views on theory within law, followed by remarks by Ronald
Allen, Leo Katz, and Stanley Fish, and commentary by Larry Alexander.
These five papers were first presented at the annual meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools, in the Section on Jurisprudence.
The first four panelists-Moore, Allen, Katz, and Fish--can be
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roughly divided into two committed theorists and two skeptics. Moore
discusses and defends theories within law-that is, theories that explain,
describe, and evaluate legal doctrine. In particular, he outlines a series
of moral justifications for the practice of constructing descriptive
theories of law. He also addresses a variety of critical and skeptical
arguments leveled against theory in law.
In contrast, Allen argues that abstract legal theory generates no
verifiable propositions, and hence is incapable of resolving legal issues.
Law, in Allen's view, is not an integrated system, but rather an organic
process in which any change will produce consequences that can never
be predicted by deductive analysis. Implicit in this argument, however,
lies a theory: that law is by nature organic and not amenable to the
logical tools of theorists.
Katz embraces legal theory, describing it as a process in which the
mind perceives symmetries and asymmetries in practices or bodies of
rules. Just how this occurs-how we perceive symmetry or asymmetry
in advance of having a theory-is somewhat mysterious. Yet, as Katz
asserts, this is often what we do in thinking theoretically about law.
Katz's argument is interesting because it describes and supports a
peculiarly "legal" type of theory, distinct from moral theory-a type of
theory that is informed by the study of law and specially adapted to the
analysis of law.
Fish eschews theory, maintaining that abstract theory is "empty of
content." That is, abstract theory has no substance independent of the
perspectival pre-commitments of the theorist. At the same time, Fish
concedes, and in fact insists, that his conclusion has no consequences.
We have no choice but to act on our pre-commitments, and the
understanding that those pre-commitments are perspectival rather than
absolute has no bearing on the use we make of them. Is there a theory of
theory here? Of course there is, although Fish's theory has the odd
property of denying its own significance (and perhaps even its existence)
and thus retreating from the scene. This leads Alexander to question
why Fish considers it important to make his initial point, that theory
lacks independent content.
Alexander makes the point that humans are inherently theorizers.
That is to say, we naturally organize and systematize the data we find in
the world, including the data of law. He then presents his own
taxonomy of the varieties of theory, which differs somewhat from
Moore's. Specifically, Alexander identifies empirical-predictive,
normative, analytical, and philosophical strands of theory.
Despite the very different views expressed here on the value of theory,
readers may conclude that all these commentators-including the
skeptics-have theories about the nature of legal theory and its relation
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to legal data. This bears out Alexander's conclusion that theory is
inescapable. It takes a theory of theory to say just what theory is or isn't
and whether it is justified.
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